Audit Open Original ↗
sigstore-rust
Type
Security review
Client
The Sigstore Project
Date
2026-10
Domain
Supply Chain
Effort
3.5 wks
Section
Technology Product Reviews
Trail of Bits's security review of The Sigstore Project (Oct 2026) identified 14 issues: 4 medium, 2 low, and 8 informational.
Findings · 14
- 1 Duplicate getters for transparency key information Informational
- 2 Verification is unsafe with skip_tlog Low
- 3 Verifier uses Rekor integratedTime before SET verification Informational
- 4 Verifier only checks certificate against earliest timestamp in bundle Low
- 5 Trust root validity period checks are incorrect Informational
- 6 Inconsistent API surface for signature verification Informational
- 7 Default verifier configuration accepts future Rekor integrated time Informational
- 8 Raw artifact signing performs potentially blocking actions in async context Informational
- 9 DSSE timestamps can authenticate a different signature than payload verification Medium
- 10 Offline TUF mode trusts mutable cached targets without authentication Medium
- 11 TSA timestamps can borrow an unrelated authority’s validity interval Medium
- 12 Verifier expects proposed in-toto entries instead of canonical log entries Informational
- 13 Delegation wildcards can match path separators Informational
- 14 Cached delegated roles can bypass a delegator's authority Medium
Findings extracted from the published report PDF. See the full report below for details and remediation.
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